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THE FACT/OPINION DISTINCTION: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECTIVITY OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW
"There's glory for you!" [Humpty Dumpty exclaimed.]
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you
don't - till I tell you. I meant, there's a nice knock-down
argument for you!"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean, a nice knock-down argument,"
Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a
scornful tone, "it means just what I chose it to mean -
neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master - that's all."'
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court stated
that the first amendment 3 required a distinction between state-
ments of fact and statements of opinion.4 Whether a state-
ment is fact or opinion turns upon the use of language.- The
inherent indeterminacy of words and the subjectivity of inter-
pretation makes the fact/opinion distinction difficult.6 This
Comment will address the impracticability of separating fact
from opinion. Part I will set forth the development of the
fact/opinion distinction. Part II will examine the continuum
between fact and opinion. Part III will analyze the use of
words in defining fact and opinion. Finally, Part IV will look
at how the law, that is the separation of fact and opinion, is
subject to various interpretative approaches.
1. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 213-14 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1947).
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
4. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
5. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 72-131 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FACT/OPINION
DISTINCTION
A. Theory
1. The Marketplace
Underlying the theory that "there is no such thing as a
false idea" is the purpose of free speech- the search for truth.
There are three premises upon which this principle is based.
The first, commonly associated with John Stuart Mill, 8 is
that one receives a clearer perception of truth if it is the result
of a "collision with error." 9 One can never be sure that an
opinion which we seek to suppress is false.' 0 To assume other-
wise is to assume infallibility." Hence, an individual who
seeks truth must consider opposing opinions to sift the true
from the false.'" The collision of adverse opinions is necessary
in the search for truth.13
Second, even assuming absolute truth can be found, the
political state may not be the appropriate body to make such a
determination. 14  In a democracy, popular views may be
deemed true without appropriate reflection and analysis. 15
Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that decisions by the
political state "are always or even generally correct."' 6
7. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
881-82 (1963); Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Mem-
ory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 269 (1978).
8. John Stuart Mill was a 19th century English philosopher and political econo-
mist. His book, On Liberty, converted the idea of liberty into a philosophically respect-
able doctrine, and put it in its most comprehensive, extensive, and systematic form, the
form in which it is generally known and accepted today. On Liberty is recommended
reading for many university students of political science.
9. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1983).
10. Id., See also Emerson, supra note 7.
11. J. MILL, supra note 9. See also Emerson, supra note 7.
12. J. MILL, supra note 9.
13. Id. Toward the possibility of supressing truth, Mill felt no one is justified in
controlling the expression of opinion. "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the
power, would be justified in silencing mankind." Id. at 76.
14. Schauer, supra note 7, at 270. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950). See also J. MILTON, OF EDUCATION AREOPAGITICA THE
COMMONWEALTH 58 (1911).
15. Schauer, supra note 7, at 270.
16. Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflection on the Supreme Court's Bal-
ancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 767-69 (1963).
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Third, determinations of truth and belief belong to the in-
dividual.17 The political state does not have any authority to
determine the truth or falsity of a belief: "[A]ll evidence bear-
ing on such determinations must be available to the individual
without any intervening 'preselection' by the state on the basis
of truth or falsity." 18
These are the premises of the marketplace theory, in
which the "consuming public in the marketplace of ideas,"1 9
ultimately determines which beliefs are true.20 Under this the-
ory, "false ideas need not be suppressed, for the operation of
the market ultimately will reject ideas that are in fact false." 21
2. Meiklejohn
The marketplace theory views the search for truth as the
underlying rationale for the freedom of speech. 22 Of equal im-
portance is "unrestricted public discussion as a corollary to
democratic theory... ."23 Intelligent and well-informed deci-
sion-making by the public is essential to self-government.24
This is the Meiklejohn theory of the first amendment.25
17. Schauer, supra note 7, at 270.
18. Id. at 271. See also Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
1020, 1041 (1973).
"The government has no authority to render religious associations either legiti-
mate or illegitimate any more than it has this authority in regard to art and
science. These matters are simply not within its competence as defined by a just
constitution. Rather, given the principles of justice, the state must be under-
stood as the association consisting of equal citizens. It does not concern itself
with philosophical and religious doctrine but regulates individuals' pursuit of
their moral and spiritual interests in accordance with principles to which they
themselves would agree in an initial situation of equality."
Id. (quoting J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212 (1971)).
19. Schauer, supra note 7, at 271.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 271-72. The marketplace theory is not without criticism. The market-
place theory may not be particularly accurate given the structure of the market for the
competition of ideas. It assumes a perfectly competitive market. This assumption is
seriously questionable in light of the monopoly power which the media utilizes to selec-
tively disseminate news to the public.
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
23. Schauer, supra note 7, at 272. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
25. Id. at 24; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245; Schauer, supra note 7, at 272. For elaboration, discussion, and criticism of the
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Meiklejohn's theory functions on both a political and per-
sonal level. Politically, free speech is necessary in a demo-
cratic form of government. z6  The people govern.2 7  The
freedom to form and communicate one's own opinion is a
must in the forming of individual and common judgments for
the good of all. 28 Personally, freedom of expression in the ar-
eas of human interest, that is, art, philosophy, science, etc., is
necessary to make knowledgeable decisions regarding public
interests.29 Under Meiklejohn's theory, the value of the first
amendment is the communication of ideas as it is under mar-
ketplace theory.30
B. History
The distinction between fact and opinion was first made
under the common law privilege of fair comment.31 The privi-
lege of fair comment shielded an individual from liability if
the alleged defamatory statements were pure expressions of
opinion on matters of public interest. 32 Courts, however, were
unable to agree on how the distinction between fact and opin-
Meiklejohn theory, see Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Emerson, supra note 7, at 882-84.
26. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 24; Schauer, supra note 7, at 272-73.
27. The premise is that a democratic society is one in which "the people hold the
ruling power either directly or through elected representatives; ruled by the ruled."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 375 (2d. ed. 1976).
28. Emerson, supra note 7, at 883. "[T]he right of all members of society to form
their own beliefs and communicate them freely to others must be regarded as an essen-
tial principle of a democratically-organized society." Id. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 24.
29. Emerson, supra note 7, at 879-81; Schauer, supra note 7, at 273.
30. Schauer, supra note 7, at 273. Freedom to express opinion and belief allow an
individual to make intelligent and knowledgable decisions regarding his society and
state. The value of speech is in the information communicated. Id.
3 1. Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need
for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817 (1984). There is some dispute among schol-
ars as to whether fair comment is a privilege, a right, or a defense. See, e.g., Carman,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense: An Alternative to
"Actual Malice," 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1980); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEX.
L. REV. 41, 42 (1929).
32. Carman, supra note 31, at 11; Note, supra note 31, at 1819. There are five
elements to the privilege of fair comment: "(1) the allegedly defamatory statement must
be opinion, not fact; (2) that opinion must be based on truly stated facts; (3) the opinion
cannot be an overly personal attack against the plaintiff; (4) the protected opinion must
relate to a matter of public interest; and (5) the opinion must not be stated with malice."
Carman, supra note 31, at 11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment
b (1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-610 (1938).
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ion should be made. 3 Some courts simply refused to make
the distinction.34
The fact/opinion distinction remained the province of the
fair comment privilege for most of American history.35 It was
not until 1964, in the landmark case of New York Times v.
Sullivan,36 that first amendment protection was extended to
the area of defamation law.3 7 New York Times protected criti-
cisms of public officials acting in their official capacity. 38 The
Court held that a public official could not recover damages for
defamatory falsehoods concerning official conduct unless the
33. See generally Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious
Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1203, 1221 (1962).
34. In Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Ala. 1966), the Alaska
Supreme Court rejected the fact-opinion distinction. In Pearson, the Fairbanks Daily
News-Miner published an editorial attacking syndicated columnist Drew Pearson. The
day before, the News-Miner had published an article Pearson had written about Alaska's
statehood effort. Id. at 712. The editorial stated that one of Pearson's colleagues had
described him as the "Garbage Man of the Fourth Estate," and a subsequent editorial
stated that the News-Miner was discontinuing Pearson's column because the newspaper
"did not wish to distribute garbage." Id. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the
challenged statements in the editorials were false statements of fact, but concluded that
they should be protected. Id. at 713. The court rejected the majority rule due to the
tenuousness of the fact-opinion distinction and extended the fair comment privilege to
non-malicious misstatements of fact. Id. at 713-14.
35. It was not until the first part of the 20th century that the first amendment
guarantee of free speech was held applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
Then in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court found
libelous statements to be outside the protection afforded by the first amendment. The
Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include ... the libelous .... Such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72. See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libelous utter-
ances not within the area of constitutionally protected speech).
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Id. at 282-83.
38. Id. In New York Times v. Sullivan, a Commissioner of the City of Montgom-
ery, Alabama, alleged that he had been libeled by a newspaper advertisement, which
included statements, some of which were false, about police action allegedly directed
against participants in a civil rights demonstration and a leader of the civil rights move-
ment. He claimed the statements referred to him because his duties as commissioner
included supervising the police department. Id. at 256-58.
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falsehoods were uttered with "actual malice," - knowledge or
reckless disregard of falsity.39
Ten years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,4° the
Supreme Court raised the fact/opinion distinction to a consti-
tutional level.4 1 The Court stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no consti-
tutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the inten-
tional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's
interest in "uninhibited robust, and wide-open" debate on
public issues.42
The Court, drawing a distinction between fact and opinion,
did not apply the distinction, but rather decided the case on
other grounds.43 Gertz claimed he had been libeled by a pub-
lication which labeled him a "Leninist" and a "Communist-
fronter." The Court, noting their defamatory nature, did
not address whether the statements were fact or opinion.45 In-
stead, the Court found Gertz to be a private figure, held the
New York Times standard inapplicable, and remanded the
case for a new trial.46
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court
expressly addressed the fact/opinion distinction was Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing Assoc. v. Bresler.47 Bresler was a real
estate developer who sought to obtain zoning variances from
the Greenbelt City Council. 48 The city council was in the pro-
cess of attempting to acquire land, owned by Bresler, to build
39. Id. at 279-80.
40. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
41. In New York Times, the Supreme Court hinted that there might be a constitu-
tional distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion. New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 292 n.30.
42. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270) (footnote
omitted).
43. Rather than pursuing the fact opinion distinction, the Court examined the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against liability for the defamation of a
private figure. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
44. Id. at 326.
45. Id. at 331 n.4.
46. Id. at 352.
47. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
48. Id. at 7.
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a new school.4 9 Negotiations between the two parties became
heated and the term "blackmail" was used to characterize
Bresler's bargaining tactics.50 Bresler sued for libel5I after the
Greenbelt News Review printed these remarks. 2 The Court,
while noting the word could be read as charging the crime of
blackmail, stated that this was not a reasonable reading of the
context of the article.53 The Court held that the use of the
word "blackmail" was "no more than rhetorical hyperbole"
and not actionable. 4
In National Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin,55 (Old Do-
minion) decided the same day as Gertz, the Court followed
Greenbelt in finding that the word "scab" and its definition
were used in a "loose, figurative sense," and were statements
of opinion not of fact. 6 In Old Dominion, a union newsletter
had been distributed which described individuals who refused
to join the union as "scabs." ' 57 A "scab" was defined as "a
traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class." 58 A
defamation action was brought against the union.59 Although
the case was decided upon the basis of federal labor law, the
Court termed the definition of scab as "merely rhetorical hy-
perbole" and thus protected.6
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 7-8.
53. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). The Court stated:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word "black-
mail" in either article would not have understood exactly what was meant: it was
Bresler's public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being criticized.
No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the
newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bresler with the commis-
sion of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader must
have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous
epithet used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely
unreasonable.
Id.
54. Id.
55. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
56. Id. at 284.
57. Id. at 267.
58. Id. at 268.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 285-86. The Court stated:
It is similarily impossible to believe that any reader.., would have understood
the newsletter to be charging the appellees with committing the criminal offense
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court has raised the fact/opinion distinction
to a constitutional level but has failed to define fact or opin-
ion.6' Assuming that the completion of such a task is possible,
it is not likely. The Supreme Court recently refused to ex-
amine the issue.62  Lower courts are left to formulate their
own theories of fact and opinion.63
IL THE FACT/OPINION CONTINUUM
Statements cannot be divided into rigid categories of fact
and opinion. 64 Rather a continuum exists: "Quite often, the
factual word used to describe a factual object or occurrence
will result in a statement containing some belief or opinion. 65
A "fact" in its most basic form refers to a tangible object.66
The words may be compared to the object to determine the
relation between the two.67 The statement that a person is
holding a pen in hand may be deemed a fact because one can
presumably observe whether in fact a pen is in that person's
hand.
At the other end of the spectrum is opinion. Opinion can-
not be compared to a physical object or to accepted criteria in
order to determine truth or falsity.68 Such statements may
concern the existence of God or the nature of knowledge.69
Between the two extremes of fact and opinion is an area
where fact and opinion are inseparably meshed - an area
where statements involve varying degrees of inference and
of treason . . . . [The] "definition of a scab" is merely rhetorical hyperbole, a
lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members towards
those who refused to join.
Id. (footnote omitted).
61. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that Gertz
provided little guidance as to how to distinguish between fact and opinion).
62. See Ollman v. Evans, cert denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
63. See generally Note, supra note 31 for a discussion of how courts have dealt with
the fact/opinion distinction.
64. Schauer, supra note 7, at 276-81.
65. Id. at 279 n.64.
66. Id. at 277.
67. Id. On verifiability, see generally F. WAISMANN, How I SEE PHILOSOPHY 39-
66 (1968).
68. Schauer, supra note 7, at 278.
69. See DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a
Telelogical Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161,
204 (1972).
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value judgment.7° Indeed, "[m]ost speech will contain some
elements of fact, some of inference, some of emotion, and
some of value judgment. '7 1 For example, assume a person ob-
serves a fellow classmate reading late on a Friday evening.
The person then makes the statement, "John Doe is a diligent
student." This statement is neither purely fact nor purely
opinion. The fact that the student was reading late on a Fri-
day evening may be verified. However, the person has in-
ferred from the fact of reading that the student was studying.
The statement now includes some degree of opinion or belief.
The student, in fact, could have been reading the latest science
fiction best seller merely for pleasure. The statement may also
reflect the person's emotions toward, and judgments of, that
student. Rather than characterizing the student as diligent,
the observer could have described the student as "an
egghead." Both statements would have originated from the
same verifiable fact of reading, however, both are inseparable
from the observer's opinion of that student.
III. THE USE OF WORDS
A. The Inherent Indeterminacy of Words
The inherent indeterminacy of words makes any distinc-
tion between fact and opinion a subjective determination.72
70. Schauer, supra note 7, at 279 n.64.
If I refer to someone as an alcoholic, I should be referring to a relatively identifi-
able illness, although there is some amount of inference in diagnosing the illness
from the directly observable symptoms. But if instead I use the word "drunk," I
may have the same object in mind, as well as the same inferences, but I have
added a degree of negative personal judgment. It becomes more of a mixed
statement of fact and belief. If I refer to someone as a "theorectical academi-
cian," I am probably being complimentary, but if I call that same person an
"egghead" the meaning changes substantially. So it also is with a great deal of
speech that cannot be easily pigeonholed as fact or opinion.
Id. See also Hallen, supra note 31, at 53 (question of what should be called fact and
opinion is difficult).
71. Schauer, supra note 7, at 279 n.64.
72. Cf with Williams, Language and the Law, 6l LAW Q. Rav. 179, 186 (1945)
(the line drawn between fact and opinion is necessarily an arbitrary one).
1987]
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1. Words Are Artificial Creations
Words are artificial creations designed to facilitate com-
munication.73 Communication would be impossible if we each
spoke a separate language.7 4 As a result words are given nor-
mative meanings. 75 A commonly accepted meaning of a word
allows the speaker and listener to picture the same image.76
Thus the word C-A-T causes the speaker and the listener to
envision a four-legged, furry animal of the feline species.
Words, however, may be subject to various and changing
meanings.77 For example, consider the word "bastard." Lit-
erally the word bastard means a child born out of wedlock. 8
Colloquially it may mean an individual who is regarded with
contempt or hatred.79 When used literally, the term suggests
a fact.8 1 When used colloquially, the term becomes opinion -
a value judgment.8 As a result, when an individual is referred
to as a "bastard" it may be interpreted as fact or as opinion.82
2. The Ambiguity of Words
The meanings attributed to words are the result of a dy-
namic interpretive process between text and reader or speaker
and listener.8 3 In every conversation, ambiguous words are
engaged by the speaker.8 4 Although people attempt to use
words intelligibly, the words used are redefined by the variety
of contexts in which they are used and by the variety of exper-
iences people attempt to communicate.8 5 The possibilities of
73. Schauer, supra note 7, at 282.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Williams, supra note 72, at 180.
78. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 118 (2d ed. 1976).
79. Id.
80. A fact is the "state of things as they are; reality; actuality; truth." Id. at 501.
81. An opinion is a "belief not based on absolute certainty or positive knowledge
but on what seems true, valid, or probable to one's own mind; judgment." Id. at 997.
82. Note, supra note 31, at 1825. See generally WAISMAN, supra note 67 (the way
we see a fact - i.e., what we emphasize and what we disregard - is our work).
83. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
84. White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 415, 426 (1982).
85. Id. at 426.
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human experiences, and thus the possible meanings of a word,
are unlimited.8 6
The words "fact" and "opinion" are also ambiguous.8 7 In
theory, it is easy to label a statement as either fact or opinion.
However, when one focuses upon "what is fact" or "what is
opinion," the meaning tends to fade away. 88 A statement is
either a fact or opinion depending upon how we interpret the
words, not because of any set definition.
B. The First Amendment Protects Use of Words
The first amendment precludes the government, including
the courts, from restricting expression "because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content." 89 Words
are the vital medium through which we express ourselves.
The fact/opinion distinction inevitably restricts an individ-
ual's use of words and thus his freedom of expression.90
Any distinction between fact and opinion must inevitably
be based upon someone's perception of what is fact and what
is opinion. 91 To prevent arbitrary distinctions by judges and
juries, most courts have imposed a common usage or meaning
standard. 92 The common usage or meaning of a word "is a
consensus, a linguistic majority rule. ' 93 Most words have cen-
tral "core" meanings along with a variety of "fringe" mean-
ings which may or may not have been accepted by the
86. Id. at 420.
87. WAISMAN, supra note 67, at 59.
88. Id.
89. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
90. For example, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court
recognized the existence of opinion, emotion, and judgment within the words of protest
"Fuck the Draft." These words on Cohen's jacket clearly were not intended or taken in
their most literal sense. The choice between "Fuck the Draft" and "I disagree with the
policies of the Selective Service System" is a choice that conveyed part of Cohen's mean-
ing and constituted expression within the protections of the first amendment. Cohen is
relevant here because it recognizes that the choice of words itself may be part of the
message.
91. The terms fact or opinion do not have any one objective meaning. Rather the
meaning given to the terms fact and opinion is the result of how the individual defining
the terms perceives them. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527, 533-
34 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
93. Schauer, supra note 7, at 282.
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majority.94 Subjecting the use of words to the majority's con-
sensus of what is the common use or meaning of a word vio-
lates the tradition of the first amendment. The first
amendment95 protects expression, and thus, the use of words,
from majority control.96
Subjecting the use of words to majority control would in-
hibit political argument, central to first amendment protec-
tion, and the communication of novel ideas and concepts. 97
Political argument is central to first amendment protection.98
Often, in order to make a strong political statement, words
which elicit negative emotions may be used.99 This may in-
volve the distortion of the common use or meaning of a
word. °0 For instance, the words "fascist" and "Nazi" may be
used to denounce conservative philosophies. Likewise, the
words "socialist" or "communist" may be used to denounce
philosophies to the left of one's own philosophy.'' Indeed,
individuals often tend to use the words "socialist" or "com-
munist" to refer to any disapproved change. 10 2
The communication of a new or unconventional idea may
also distort the common use or meaning of a word. 03 Lan-
guage describes "existing objects, ideas, feelings, and con-
cepts."'' Words are often used in a non-traditional sense to
express that which is new or unconventional. 1 5 Literature
often uses personification, simile, and metaphor to "break
through the boundaries of ordinary language." 106
94. Id. See generally Williams, supra note 72 for a discussion of central and fringe
meanings of words.
95. The first amendment may be interpreted as protecting the use of language from
majority control. See Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open" - A Note on Free
Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 289, 294 (1968).
96. Schauer, supra note 7, at 284. "Restricting the use of language may not only
constrain the speaker's choice of language; it also may prevent him from effectively
communicating original ideas and arguments." Id.
97. Id. at 284-85.
98. Id.
99. Schauer, supra note 7, at 284.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See F. VIVIAN, THINKING PHILOSOPHY 13 (1969).
103. Schauer, supra note 7, at 285.
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 284 n.81.
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IV. LAW AS LITERATURE
Even if the amorphous quality of a word is considered in
drawing a distinction between fact and opinion, the necessary
interpretation of the "law" will result in a subjective view of
what constitutes fact and opinion. 107 Law is like literature; it
must be interpreted. The interpretation of law reflects the in-
dividual judge's philosophies. 08
A. Literature
The interpretation of literature seeks to explicate the
meaning of a text."9 A text may be subject to more than one
interpretation - more than one meaning."10 No one interpreta-
tion may be deemed "correct," however, the interpretation
one deems the "best" will depend upon individual beliefs as to
what is good in literature."' For example, an archetypist will
view a piece of literature "better" because of the universal
human reactions it elicits." l2 Whereas a formalist will view a
piece of literature "better" because of the form in the literary
work, that is, its shape and effect." 3
107. See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
108. See Dworkin, supra note 91, at 545.
109. J. ELLIS, THE THEORY OF LITERARY CRITICISM (1974).
110. Id.
111. Dworkin, supra note 91.
112. W. GUERIN, E. LABOR, L. MORGAN, & J. WILLINGHAM, A HANDBOOK OF
CRITICAL APPROACHES To LITERATURE 154-55 (1979) [hereinafter W. GUERIN].
[I]t is with the relationship of literary art to "some very deep chord" in human
nature that mythological criticism deals. The myth critic is concerned to seek
out those mysterious elements that inform certain literary marks, and that elicit,
with almost uncanny force, dramatic and universal human reactions. He wishes
to discover how it is that certain works of literature, usually those that have
become, or promise to become, "classics," image a kind of reality to which read-
ers give perennial response - while other works, seemingly as well constructed,
and even some forms of reality, leave us cold. Speaking figuratively, the myth
critic studies in depth the "wooden hawks" of great literature: the so-called ar-
chetypes or archetypal patterns that the writer has drawn forward along the
tensed structural wires of his masterpiece and that vibrate in such a way that a
sympathetic resonance is started deep within the reader.
Id. at 116.
113. Id. at 45.
As its name suggests, "formalistic" criticism has for its sole object the discovery
and explanation of form in the literary work. This approach assumes the auton-
omy of the work itself and thus the relative unimportance of extraliterary consid-
erations - the author's life; his times; sociological, political, economic, or
psychological implications .... The heart of the matter for the formalist critic is
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B. Law
Law, like literature, is subject to various interpretative ap-
proaches." 4 Unlike literature, however, interpretations of the
law must carry authority. 15 Legal disputes must be resolved
on one side or another "even when there may be no good rea-
son to prefer one interpretation over conflicting ones."' 16 The
conflicting approaches to the interpretation of law have been
the subject of ongoing debate among legal scholars." 17
The central issue of the debate is whether texts can have
any determinable and objective meaning." 8 "The law," it is
said, "must be understood to have objective meaning, because
objectivity is the only pretense that judges can offer in support
of their claim to resolve conflicts on a basis other than their
own will or the will of the politically powerful.""' 9
The debate is divided by those who believe legal interpre-
tation is or should be constrained by what is "in the text,"
that is, the positivists, and those who believe legal interpreta-
tions are rationalizations of the judge's political and personal
quite simply: What is the literary work, what are its shape and effect, and how
are these achieved? All relevant answers to these questions ought to come from
the text itself.
Id. (emphasis in original).
114. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). "Adjudica-
tion is interpretation: Adjudication is the process by which a judge comes to understand
and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that
text." Id.
115. Graft, "Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Re-
sponse to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REv. 405, 411 (1982).
There are ... special problems attending the interpretation of legal texts, or the
interpretation of texts from a legal point of view. Interpretations of statutes and
legal documents have to carry authority in a way that a literary critics' interpre-
tation of a poem or a bystander's interpretation of a remark in the street do not.
Judges have to resolve ambiguities in statutes on one side or another ....
Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally Dworkin, supra note 91; Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: In-
terpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Fiss, supra note 114;
Graff, supra note 115; Levison, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982); Nelson.
Standards of Criticism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1982); White, The Text, Interpretation
and Critical Standards, 60 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1982); White, supra note 84 (can texts
have any determinable and objective meaning).
118. White, supra note 84, at 416.
119. Nelson, supra note 117, at 447.
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beliefs, that is, the realists. 20 It is a division of the purely
objective and the purely subjective. 121
Legal positivists believe that the law is wholly descriptive -
that legal propositions are in fact "pieces of history." 122 Ob-
jectivity, in their view, is obtained through the constraining
nature of the text. 123 Judge interpretations are limited by the
text. Their interpretations are only reflections of what the law
is and not what they think it should be. 124
Realists, on the other hand, make no attempt to achieve
objectivity. Realists accept the subjective nature of the law.
Judges are free to interpret the law according to their judicial
philosophies. 12 5
Other legal scholars propose that the interpretative pro-
cess is transformed from a subjective to an objective process
through constraints. 126 Some scholars believe that judicial in-
terpretation is constrained by precedent; 127 others feel judicial
interpretation is constrained by morality;12 8 still others argue
community acceptance acts as an interpretive constraint. 29
120. Fish, supra note 117, at 551.
121. Id. at 551-52.
122. Dworkin, supra note 91, at 527-28.
123. Id.
124. Fish, supra note 117, at 551.
125. Id.
126. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
127. See Dworkin, supra note 91. Dworkin draws an analogy between precedent
and the imagined literary example of a novel written not by a single author but by a
group of co-authors, each of whom is responsible for a separate chapter. The members
of the group draw lots. The lowest number writes the opening chapter of a novel, which
he or she then sends to the next number who adds a chapter, with the understanding
that he is adding a chapter to that novel rather than beginning a new one. Then he
sends the two chapters to the next number, and so on. Now every novelist but the first
has the dual responsibilities of interpreting and creating, because each must read all that
has gone before in order to establish, in the interpretivist sense, what the novel so far
created is. He or she must decide what the characters are "really" like; what motives in
fact guide them; what the point or theme of the developing novel is; how far some
literary device or figure, consciously or unconsciously used, contributes to these, and
whether it should be extended or refined or trimmed or dropped in order to send the
novel further in one direction rather than another. Id. at 541-42.
128. Fiss, supra note 114, at 751. "Interpretation does not require agreement or
consensus, nor does the objective character of legal interpretation arise from agreement.
What is being embodied in that text, not what individual people believe to be the good
or right." Id.
129. Fiss, supra note 114.
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Undermining all views of legal interpretations is the view
"that for any text there are any number of possible meanings
and the interpreter creates a meaning by choosing one."' 130
This "nihilism" is also present in literary criticism and is re-
ferred to as "deconstructionism."' ' 31
Which philosophy of legal interpretation is "best?" The
answer to this question will depend upon each individual's
own judicial philosophies.
C. Oliman v. Evans
The fact/opinion distinction is subject to a variety of inter-
pretations. Each determination will reflect the individual's
view of what is fact and what is opinion.
Consider the lesson of Olman v. Evans. 131 Bertell Ollman,
an avowed Marxist, was a professor of political science at
New York University. In March 1978, he was nominated by
a departmental search committee to head the Department of
Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. The
committee's recommendation was approved by the provost of
the University and the chancellor of the College Park campus,
but was eventually overruled by the University's president. 133
The nomination proved to be highly controversial. In the
midst of this controversy Rowland Evans and Robert Novak,
nationally syndicated columnists, published a column titled
"The Marxist Professor's Intentions."' 134 The column asserted
that Ollman's "candid writings" revealed a desire to "use the
130. Id. at 762.
131. Campbell, The Tyranny of the Yale Critics, N.Y.Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at A28,
col. 3.
What is deconstruction? To "deconstruct" a text is pretty much what it sounds
like - to pick the thing carefully apart, exposing what deconstructors see as the
central fact and tragic little secret of Western philosophy - namely, the circular
tendency of language to refer to itself. Because the "language" of a text refers
mainly to other "languages" and texts - and not to some hard, extra tuxtral
reality - the text tends to have several possible meanings, which usually under-
mine one another. In fact, the "meaning" of a piece of writing - doesn't matter
whether it's a poem or a novel or a philosophical treatise - is indeterminate.
Id. See generally H. BLOOM, DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM (1979); R. DAVIS &
R. SCHLEIFER, RHETORIC AND FORM: DECONSTRUCTION AT YALE (1985) (for appli-
cation of the deconstructionist theory).
132. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
133. Id. at 971-72.
134. Id. at 971.
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classroom as an instrument for preparing what [Olman] calls
the 'revolution.' "135 The column went on to add that a polit-
ical scientist in a major eastern university, whose scholarship
and reputation as a liberal were well known, had stated that
"Ollman [had] no status within the profession, but [was] a
pure and simple activist."' 136
Ollman brought a defamation action against Evans and
Novak. The complaint alleged that several of the statements
in the column were false and defamatory and had resulted in
Ollman being denied the chairmanship. 137 The district court
granted Evans' and Novak's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that the column simply reflected the columnists'
opinions and interpretations of Ollman's writings.138
In a plurality opinion, the court of appeals held the state-
ments to be constitutionally protected expressions of opin-
ion.' 39  The decision, however, produced three differing
approaches to the fact/opinion distinction and resulted in dis-
agreement as to whether the statements regarding Ollman's
alleged desire to use the classroom in preparation of revolu-
tion, and lack of status within his profession, were fact or
opinion. 14°
Judge Starr, in the opinion for the court, set forth a four-
factor test to separate fact from opinion and held the state-
ments to be opinion. 141 Judge Bork, concurring, felt that rigid
categories of fact and opinion were inadequate and that the
totality of the circumstances should be considered to deter-
mine whether the statements in question deserved first amend-
135. Id. at 972.
136. Id. at 989.
137. Id. at 973 n.l.
138. Id. at 973. The district court expressly held that the expressions of opinion
implied no "underlying false or defamatory statements of fact." Oilman v. Evans, 479
F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.D.C. 1979).
139. Olman, 750 F.2d at 987, 989-90. The court analyzed three challenged state-
ments: the statement that "Ollman is an outspoken proponent of political Marxism;"
the statements from and about his writings; and the statement that "Oilman has no
status within the profession but is a pure and simple activist." Id. at 987-89.
140. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
141. 750 F.2d at 979. The first step in the test involves an analysis of the common
usage or meaning of the specified language of the challenged statement itself. Second,
the court considers the statement's verifiability. Third, moving from the challenged
language itself, the court considers the full context of the statement. Finally, the court
analyzes the broader context or setting in which the statement appears. Id.
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ment protection.' 42 He found the statements in Olman to be
opinion. '43
Judge Robinson recognized a continuum between fact and
opinion. 14 Hybrid statements reflected deductions or evalua-
tions based upon fact. If the facts supporting the evaluation
were reasonably full and accurate, the statement deserved first
amendment protection. 45 If facts were omitted or were in er-
ror one had to consider whether culpability was great enough
to incur liability under relevant state defamation law. If not,
the statement was entitled to first amendment protection.'
46
Robinson felt the statements in question were hybrids.' 47
Judges Wald, Edwards, and Scalia also filed separate opin-
ions. ' 48 Each felt that the statement disparaging Ollman's
professional reputation was actionable libel and not protacted
opinion. 14 9
The court in Olman attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween fact and opinion. The differing approaches to the dis-
tinction and the disagreement as to how the statements in
question should be characterized demonstrates the practical
difficulty in distinguishing fact from opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law involving the first amendment
fact/opinion distinction is contradictory and muddled. While
the Supreme Court's dicta in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 150 is
commonly accepted as establishing absolute first amendment
protection for opinion, there is no single accepted method by
which the distinction can be made between statements of fact
and statements of opinion.
This article is as much an exercise in jurisprudential
thought as in traditional doctrinal analysis. Its purpose is to
142. Id. at 997.
143. Id. at 1010.
144. Id. at 1021. He states that "[flact is the germ of opinion, and the transition
from assertion of fact to expression of opinion is a progression along a continuum." Id.
145. Id. at 1022-24.
146. Id. at 1024.
147. Id. at 1029.
148. Id. at 1032-39.
149. Id. at 1033.
150. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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suggest how difficult it is to provide an analytically sound test
for the distinction of fact and opinion. It has attempted to
expose the problems created by language's inherent subjectiv-
ity. The assumption that one can draw a bright line rule be-
tween fact and opinion is troublesome. The concepts of fact
and opinion are subject to rigid categorization in only the
most extreme situations. Most statements are an inseparable
mixture of fact and opinion.
Furthermore, the assumption that words such as "fact"
and "opinion" have concrete meanings is functionally inade-
quate. The fear is that the erroneous determination of "opin-
ion" as "fact" can result in denial of the first amendment right
of freedom of expression.
As a natural progression from the discussion of the inher-
ent subjectivity of language, this article examined the schol-
arly debate concerning the interpretation of law. Our
understanding of law can be improved by comparing legal in-
terpretation with the interpretation of literature. The debate
is divided, in short, between those scholars who believe that
interpretation is grounded in objectivity and those who believe
that interpretation is free from constraint.
The difficulty of characterizing fact and opinion is repre-
sentative of the difficulties faced in the interpretation of law.
The conceptual difficulty in determining what a word
"means" parallels the difficulty in determining the meaning of
a text. The indeterminacy of language is eloquently stated by
Justice Holmes: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and un-
changed, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and times in which it is used."15
MICHAELE SANDERS
151. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240
U.S. 60, 65 (1916)).
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